Abstract. A simple and effective way of coordinating distributed, mobile, and parallel applications is to use a virtual shared memory (VSM), such as a Linda tuple-space. In this paper, we propose a new kind of VSM, called a tagged set. Each element in the VSM is a value with an associated tag, and values are read or removed from the VSM by matching the tag. Tagged sets exhibit three properties useful for VSMs:
Introduction
Whether at a Fortune-500 company or within a private home, computer users require means to store, share, retrieve, and compute data to perform a myriad of tasks. Currently, these means are provided in different ways in different settings, ranging from relational databases to file systems to individual applications. To be useful, any data management approach must answer basic questions concerning organization and security:
2. Is the data protected from malicious tampering? Are the policies for doing so flexible and easy to use?
Relational databases are extremely flexible and optimized for concurrency, fault-tolerance, and throughput. However, they can be difficult to use, particularly in setting up and managing schemas. They also typically provide only coarse-grained security policies. File systems are easy to understand, and support flexible and intuitive security policies, but have a limited organizational capacity. Linda-style tuple spaces, and more generally virtual shared memories (VSMs), have a simple and effective organizational strategy, but typical Linda spaces have limited support for security.
In this paper, we propose to manage data as tagged values forming part of a tagged set. Our approach is inspired by the simplicity and power of the many applications that use tagging as their organizational mechanism, including Google Mail (GMail) and the iLife suite (iTunes, iPhoto, etc.).
A tagged value is merely some data with attached meta-information specified as a tag. Tags are typically used to organize data. For example, iTunes uses the notion of a playlist to organize songs. A playlist is essentially a kind of tag, with each song tagged with the playlist (or playlists) it belongs to, and perhaps the order in which it should played for a given list. A photo album in iPhoto is a similar idea. A file system can also be viewed as tagging system by considering each directory name as a tag; a file "stored" in some directory d is tagged with d. The richer the language for tags, the more organizational traits one can express. In our approach, we encode tags as propositional logic formulae; selecting tagged data from a set is done by logical implication. This approach is powerful enough to easily construct the above examples, as well as to encode more structured repositories, like Linda-style tuple spaces.
In our system, tags serve not only to organize data, but also to protect it from unauthorized access. A tag corresponds naturally to the idea of a key (or capability). A user may not select data in a tagged set unless she presents the keys that protect it. Normal tags correspond to symmetric keys, and we introduce asymmetric tags that correspond to public and private key pairs. Treating tags as keys permits users to easily specify protection criteria for data at a fine granularity. Like a file system, individual tagged values can have widely differing access policies. We illustrate this idea by encoding a secure GMail, and extending the Linda-space encoding to incorporate security tags.
Treating tags as keys naturally lends itself to a distributed setting, which is important if tagged sets are to be used as a coordination medium between cooperating applications. By literally using tags as cryptographic keys, we can encrypt data to ensure it can only be read the appropriate key holder. (As expected, with asymmetric tags we can do this without requiring the host of the tagged set know a user's private tag/key.)
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
-We present a simple formalism for tagged sets (Section 2). The key novelty of our approach is the use of propositional logic as the language of tags, and logical implication as the means to select tagged data.
-We show how tags can be treated as keys in order to protect data at a fine granularity (Section 3). We prove a confidentiality theorem that loosely states that one cannot select data protected by some tag t unless he is in possession of that tag. Tags can be used as cryptographic keys, both symmetric and asymmetric, for secure sharing over a distributed medium. -We sketch basic implementation issues (Section 4), compare with related work (Section 5), and forecast future directions (Section 6).
Tagged Sets
At the most basic level, data stored within a repository can be tagged with attributes that describe the data. More formally, a repository is a multi-set of pairs τ, v , where each pair consists of a tag τ , and a value v. We use the {| · |} notation to clarify our use of multi-sets (which can contain more than one copy of the same element) rather than sets.
As an example, consider an audio repository S containing 3 clips (clip 1 , clip 2 , and clip 3 ), each of which is tagged to indicate its genre, drawing from topics Jazz, Classical, and Blues. If each clip falls squarely under one genre, we can tag them as such:
Naturally, a clip could well be described by more than one genre. For example, if clip clip 1 is in genres Jazz and Blues, we could set up the repository as:
To select the clips belonging to a particular genre, we perform a selection operation (designated ↓) on the repository. For example, to select the clips in genre Blues, we would have:
Selection as Logical Implication
We naturally think of selection as a kind of matching: to select with tag Jazz yields those elements whose tags contain Jazz. However, by considering the selection tag and the data tags as propositions, we can view selection more generally as a kind of implication: selecting tag t in set S yields those elements in S whose tags τ are implied by t. This notion is made precise in Figure 1 , which gives the syntax and semantics of tagged sets. A tagged set S represents a set of tagged values. Sets are defined by set literals {| τ, v |}, possibly modified by operators ∪, ↓, and −, discussed below. Values v in these sets are drawn from the countably-infinite set V ; their exact makeup is not important for our purposes. Tags are constructed from tag literals t (drawn from the countably-infinite set T ), (representing "all tags"), and standard operators ∨ ("or") and ∧ ("and"). We do not have ¬ or ⊥ as ] which maps the syntactic notion of tagged set S to a mathematical multi-set containing pairs of propositions and values. As described above, S ↓ τ denotes the set whose elements are contained in S, but whose tags are implied by the selection tag τ , following the rules of propositional logic. For example, in (1) we have S ↓ Blues = {| Jazz ∨ Blues, clip 1 , Blues, clip 3 |} since Blues Jazz ∨ Blues, Blues Classical and
Blues Blues
The inference rules for deriving judgments τ τ are standard; the are presented with one extension in Figure 4 in the next section. The syntax S 1 ∪S 2 denotes the tagged set that results from the combination of tagged sets S 1 and S 2 (using multi-set union). S − τ denotes those tagged values not implied by the selection tag. Finally, one can limit the results of a selection or subtraction to n elements using the ↓ n and − n operators, respectively. The actual contents of the defined set are non-deterministically chosen.
We can illustrate ∪ and − with some additional examples. To define a refinement of S that covers genres Jazz or Classical could be done with two selections, and taking the union of the results:
To select those documents that cover both genres Jazz and Blues, we can do one of two things:
To select those documents that cover genre Blues but not topic Jazz, we perform a selection followed by a subtraction:
(S ↓ Blues) − Jazz = {| Blues, clip 3 |}
Playlists as Ordered Tuples
So far, we have not considered tags defined with ∧. These are interesting because they effectively restrict selections: if a value has tag t 1 ∧ t 2 , then it cannot be selected with either t 1 or t 2 alone: t 1 t 1 ∧ t 2 and t 2 t 1 ∧ t 2 . This allows data to be "structured" by using ∧ tags.
As a simple example, we can extend our audio repository with playlists. Clips may belong to more than one playlist, and within each, they are played in a particular order. Thus a playlist is essentially a tuple: the first element in a tuple designates the first clip to be played; the second element designates the second clip, etc. With tagged sets, we can designate clips clip 1 , clip 2 , and clip 3 as tracks one, two, and three of playlist Favorites, respectively, by defining repository S p as follows:
To play the first track of Favorites, we select it with Favorites ∧ 1; to play the second we select with Favorites ∧ 2, and so on:
To permit selecting all songs in a playlist, we can store the clips using a special tag Any:
To select all of the songs in playlist Favorites, we simply do S p ↓ Favorites ∧ Any.
Of course, we can continue to organize songs by genre as well as by playlist:
Tuple sets with Linda-style Matching
We can formalize this basic encoding of tuples to include matching as in Lindastyle tuple spaces [4] . (We do not consider synchronization here; the next section considers means to specify a shared repository.) Consider the syntax of our simple language of tuple sets shown in Figure 2 . The basic operations on tuple sets T are similar to those on tagged sets, but rather than performing selections based on a tag, the user provides a pattern p. This pattern consists of either a value v or a wildcard ? which matches any value. Tuple values tv are simple constants, like the integers and strings. Subtraction with T − p is as with tagged sets: it defines the set T with all elements in T removed that match p.
As an example, say we have the following tuple set which mentions the birthdays of Alice and Bob: T = {|("birthday", "alice", 10, 29, 1991), ("birthday", "bob", 10, 4, 1993)|} If we wanted to select all birthday records, we could do:
T ↓ ("birthday", ?, ?, ?, ?) = {| ("birthday", "alice", 10, 29, 1991), ("birthday", "bob", 10, 4, 1993)|}
If we wanted only Alice's birthday, we could do T ↓ ("birthday", "alice", ?, ?, ?) = {|("birthday", "alice", 10, 29, 1991)|} (4) Conversely, we could define the set with an arbitrary birthday element removed:
T − 1 ("birthday", ?, ?, ?, ?) = {|("birthday", "bob", 10, 4, 1993)|} or {|("birthday", "alice", 10, 29, 1991)|}
The selections in Examples (3) and (4) are similar to what is possible with the out(-) operator for Linda-spaces. Example (5) is like the Linda-space in(-), which removes a single tuple from the space (as our language is declarative, we actually define a new tuple set which lacks an element present in the original). The next section presents more direct analogues to traditional Linda operators.
Tuple sets and their operations can be encoded using tagged sets. Shown in Figure 2 , the translation function L[[·]] maps tuple sets T to tagged sets S, employing auxiliary function T [[·]] to map patterns p to tags τ . In the tagged set, the tuple is stored as the value part of the tagged value (i.e., it is in V ), and the tag encodes its structure. The first part of the tag is the tuple length n; to select a tuple of length n one must provide this length as a tag. The second part is a union of tags, one for each element in the tuple. As with playlists, these tags encode the position of the element i as tag i. In addition, we include the element v itself as tag, so that we can match literal values present in patterns. The resulting element tag is thus i ∧ v. Selection patterns are encoded similarly, except that when a ? appears in a pattern, it does not appear in the tag. This way, it has no bearing on the selection (thus encoding its meaning as a "wild card"). Note that we ignore the possible collision between the tags of indices (i), the tag for indicating size (n), and integer values used as tags. Addressing this problem would be straightforward.
Here are some examples that illustrate the translation:
Tuple sets Tagged sets
Tagged sets are not rich enough to encode SQL-style queries, mainly because tags can only be used to match set elements; they cannot be manipulated to form new elements directly. To some extent, this could be done in a programming language that builds on top of tagged sets to extract the desired elements and construct a joined tagged set as a result. Even in this case, though, the matching mechanism in selection only permits tags to be matched exactly; it is not possible to, for example, treat a tag as an integer and then return all tagged values whose tag is "greater than 1" as would be possible in SQL. We are considering such extensions.
Secure Tags
If a tagged set is to be used in a secure, multi-user setting, it should enforce confidentiality and provide access control so that users can ensure that their data is only visible to users whom they trust. For example, a typical file system labels a file with an access control list, specifying an effective list of users and the operations they can perform on the file (e.g., read, write, delete).
A useful feature of tagged sets is that "user lists," or more properly operation system-style capabilities, can be encoded using tags. That is, a tag can be viewed as a key, which means that to select a value, one must produce the key with which it is locked. A value can be locked multiple times (using ∧) requiring the selector produce multiple keys to unlock it. A value may have alternate access points (using ∨) which permits unlocking with different key sets.
In the remainder of this section, we show how tags can form the foundation of secure access control of shared data. We present a simple interface for shared tagged sets that ensures confidentiality. Then we show how asymmetric tags can be used to support public key-style encryption in tagged sets. Finally, we consider how to provide secure, distributed access to a shared tagged set.
A Shared Repository
Imagine we wish to define tagged sets that may be shared by processes within an operating system. We extend our presentation so far in two ways. First, we define variables x to name shared tagged sets; a tagged set can "looked up" by multiple processes using its variable name. Second, we specify a list of commands for manipulating named tagged sets that respect the confidentiality policies of data stored in them; these policies are specified by tags. The syntax and semantics of these changes is shown in Figure 3 .
Shared tagged sets SS are tagged sets S extended to include variable names x, whose semantics is simply to look up the tagged set named by x from a global store. We designate this in the semantics D [[x] ] as the function lookup(x); elsewhere we use the function update(x, s) to designate updating the name x in the global store to refer to multi-set s.
Commands cmd can be used by processes to manipulate shared tagged sets: read τ (SS) reads (selects) data from a tagged set SS; add τ (x, SS) adds the set SS to the named tagged set x (using multi-set union ∪), and remove τ (x, SS) removes data in set SS from the named tagged set x (using multi-set subtraction). Note that we essentially get Linda tuple spaces by combining these commands with the tuple encoding presented earlier. The security of these commands is based on implication: to read, add, or remove data having tag t from a shared set, the user must hold a "credential" τ that implies t; the credential τ is presented as a subscript on each operation.
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Without requiring a credential, a user could use subtraction to extract elements from a shared set for which she did not hold the tags. For example, say that x is bound to {| Jazz ∨ Blues, clip 1 , Classical, clip 2 , Blues, clip 3 |}, and the user knows about the tag Classical. The user should thus only be allowed to read tagged value Classical, clip 2 , since she does not know the names of the tags on the other values. Indeed, read Classical (x − Classical) is ∅, whereas not requiring a credential and just permitting the subtraction would have yielded {| Jazz ∨ Blues, clip 1 , Blues, clip 3 |}, violating confidentiality. Tag implication has been defined so that only when a tag t "appears in" credential τ can t be selected. Thus a user must "know about" a tag, and place it in her credential, to be able select values locked with that tag. We formally state and prove this notion of confidentiality in the next subsection.
In this scheme, if the tag t is implied by the credential τ , then any data t, v can be added, removed, or read from the tagged set. We could encode richer access rights. For example, to provide separate read and removal permissions, we could define special tags Read and Remove; a value's tag would be (Read∧τ read )∨ (Remove∧τ remove ). The semantics of read τ (SS) would become D[[SS ↓ τ ∧Read]], so as to verify against the τ read part of the tag, and removal would be similar. We would also have to ensure that these special tags not appear in credentials τ , and not clash with normal tags.
Asymmetric Tags
Tags defined so far essentially correspond to symmetric keys: if the user can produce the key, he can acquire the value. We can also easily extend our notion of tag to model asymmetric keys, as are provided in public key cryptography.
Asymmetric tags are defined in pairs (k, k). As shown in the top right of Figure 4 , asymmetric tags are drawn from the countably-infinite set Keys and extend our notion of tags τ . Tagging a value using an asymmetric tag k is equivalent to locking it with an asymmetric key. To select this value requires producing the opposite tag k. We do not consider how asymmetric tags are generated; we only assume that if a tagged set contains data locked by some tag k, then it has some way of knowing when the complement tag k is provided during selection. We consider how to do this securely in a distributed setting in the next subsection. By convention, we say k is the private tag/key and k is the public tag/key.
The left side of Figure 4 shows the (slightly modified) inference rules for the fragment of propositional logic that we use in our tagging system. As usual, Γ is simply an ordered list of assumptions τ 1 , . . . , τ n . The rules employ an additional operator [·] that is the identity on symmetric tags, but the complement for asymmetric ones. We apply this operator to assumptions in the (∨ELIM) and (HYP) rules to enforce that k can only be implied by its complement k and vice versa. This relationship is not transitive: having proven k, there is no way to include it in the assumptions to prove k. If there were, it would allow the holder of a public tag k to access data tagged with that tag, rather than only allowing the holder of k to access it.
Fig. 4. Proof system extended with asymmetric tags
We can now make our notion of confidentiality precise. We wish to ensure that cmd operations do not provide or revoke access to data tagged with keys not contained in the credential τ . This boils down to proving the following property:
In a logical sense, this theorem simply states that to prove t, we have to know about t in the first place; intuitively it "appears" in our assumption τ . In the simplest case, if τ has the form t 1 ∧ . . . ∧ t n , then exactly t 1 , . . . , t n appear in τ ; only these tags can be proved by τ . Since all operations on shared tagged sets must ultimately be filtered against the credential τ , we ensure that only data whose tags appear in the credential can be manipulated. This theorem is proven by structural induction on derivations τ t, aided by some simple lemmas on the ∈ relation. A full definition of "appears in" (∈) is presented in Figure 5 .
τ1 ∧ τ2 ∈ t iff τ1 ∈ t and τ2 ∈ t 
Encoding encrypted tuples. With asymmetric tags, we can support a simple extension to our tuple language: tagging each tuple with a public key. We can modify the syntax of tuples u and patterns p in Figure 2 to be as follows: tuple u ::= k : (uv 1 , uv 2 , . . . , uv n ) pattern p ::= k : (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) Tuples now include the public key, and patterns must now specify the private key to select the desired tuple. We modify our semantic functions to take these changes into account:
While this is a simple extension of the tuple space encoding, we can encode more complex systems, such as SecOS [2] or CryptoKlava [1].
Distributed Tagged Sets
To use shared tagged sets as a distributed coordination mechanism, we have to protect the repository and the data it contains from malicious tampering. We have two goals. First, tags/keys and the data they protect should not be transmitted in clear text, to prevent snooping. Second, users should not have to present their private tag/key to the database to retrieve data stored with the public key. Here we briefly sketch two ways that these goals might be achieved.
Tag-based Encryption. Assume that a normal tag t can be used as an encryption key, and that there is a public name for every such key, with the mapping between the two known by users and the server hosting a shared tagged set. For example, the tag Red could have the name "Red". Users send commands using the public names in place of the actual tags; these messages are encrypted using the server's public key (to ensure that commands are not redirected to the wrong server). The server maps the names to tags and executes the command (e.g., Red). The result is then encrypted using the tags as keys, and sent back to the user. The encrypted response is formed as follows. For each tagged value τ, v in the selected set, we return the value as the tuple (clear(τ ), E[ τ, v ]), where clear(τ ) is a translation of τ where actual keys are replaced by their names, and E[] performs encryption as defined below:
The notation {v} t denotes encrypting v with key t. The user then maps backwards from the provided tag names to the actual tags, and decrypts the returned value.
Using a Secure Channel. The drawback of using tag-based encryption is that each command requires encryption and decryption for the server and user, respectively. We can amortize this cost by establishing a secure channel in the style of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3 . The user begins by presenting the server with a credential τ of the form t 1 ∧ . . . ∧ t n and a random value n u (again, all messages to the server are encrypted using its public key). The server challenges the user to prove he actually holds tags t 1 . . . t n by sending a message containing integers encrypted with each tag, along with a nonce (to prevent replay attacks). The user decrypts these values, and from them derives the value n s ; it also sends the decrypted values back to the server. The server verifies these values are correct.
At this point, both sides have a shared secret (n u ,n s ), and the server is satisfied that the user holds the keys in the claimed credential. The shared secret is used to encrypt communications between the two from then on. Users send encrypted commands, and the server evaluates the commands using the verified credential τ , returning the result encrypted with the shared secret.
In both approaches, the user never has to reveal his private key to the server, and all sensitive data is properly encrypted.
Implementation
We have begun to build a prototype implementation of tagged sets in Java. The most interesting challenge of an implementation is determining how to store the tagged set to support fast selection. The simple approach we currently take is to store each tagged value in a collection, with each tag τ stored in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF):
As tags in general are simply propositional formulae, an arbitrary tag can always be converted to DNF when it is stored in a tagged set.
The foundation of tagged set operations is logical implication τ τ , for each element in the tagged set. When both τ and τ are in DNF, the implication is true if any of the disjuncts in τ subsumes any of the disjuncts in τ (i.e., the former contains at least as many tags). Given a tagged set having n tagged values, tagged in general by tags having m disjuncts of k tags literals, and selected with a tag of the same size, the algorithm has a complexity of O(nkm 2 ). Obviously this simple approach will be costly if tags are large. In particular, converting an arbitrary formula to DNF when adding to a set can be quite costly, as can search times. However, these costs are mitigated when tags are small. For example, iTunes, iPhoto, and GMail will typically tag values with many single tags (a ∨ list) and select with a single tag. In this case, we can expect selection times of O(nm) where m is the length of the ∨ list.
We can clearly do better than the DNF-based approach in general, by trading space for time. For example, we could "index" tagged data to serve implication. The idea is to create a tree that mirrors the structure of a selection tag, with the nodes of the tree pointing to all of the data that would be selected at that point. This would reduce the cost of selection to the size of the selection tag, but at an enormous space cost. We are exploring reasonable middle grounds between these two extremes. It is likely that advances in SAT-solving can play a role in our implementation.
Also, the implementation could be tailored to the kind of data one can expect to store. For example, we may well store tags differently if we are encoding order tuples a la Linda spaces than if we are using them for Secure Mail. On the other hand, the ideal would be a single implementation that would allow these disparate applications both use the same shared data repository. It would be interesting to consider an adaptive approach that changes depending upon the stored data.
Related Work
Tagged sets aim to organize and share data simply and securely. They bear resemblance to databases, file systems, and structured documents (as with XML), but differ chiefly in how data is organized and secured; in our case, they are both achieved simply through tags. Buneman et al.'s labeled trees [3] bear some resemblance to our approach, except that their labels are atoms and structure occurs in the tree, whereas we have no trees, only sets, but can encode them (and other structures, such as DAGs) with our richer labels.
Linda-spaces [4] can be used as medium for coordination and data sharing. We can basically encode the same selection mechanisms of Linda in our approach. In the original Linda model, security is implied by knowledge of the tuple structure: only a correctly-specified pattern (in particular knowing the arity of the tuple) can select the data. A number of researchers have aimed to provide stronger security guarantees, e.g., to prevent untrusted mobile applications from illegally removing data from a Linda-space [9, 7, 12, 10] . These systems use a variety of access control policies (applying to the entire repository or the actions that might be performed) and verification strategies. Our approach is simple and fine-grained: users can encode access control lists and structuring mechanisms as part of a data's tag.
Our notion of tags as keys for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is similar to Gifford's Sealed Objects [5] . Sealed Objects are values encrypted/locked using a set of keys. The primitive operations are KeyAnd and KeyOr, and are analogous to our ∧ and ∨. However, in Gifford, encrypting KeyAnd [k, k] is equivalent to no encryption at all. This implies that there is no distributivity in the general case between operators KeyAnd and KeyOr (e.g.
. Thus, in a sense, our work is a generalization of Gifford's work on cryptography which couples selection with "logical locking" in a general logical framework. We conjecture that we could encode richer security labels for data, such as those in the decentralized label model (DLM) [8] .
Several Linda-based approaches have similarly proposed to provide both locking and easy selection. SecOS [2, 11] provides the ability to match encrypted tuples. SecOS values can only be encrypted by one key, whereas our use of logical formulas provides many possible combinations of keys per value, without inhibiting selection. CryptoKlava [1] encrypts tuple elements. Selection requires an agent to select the tuple to decrypt it, and relies on the "good behavior" of the agents to put back the tuples that they cannot decrypt. The key itself does not play any role in the initial selection. It is similar to the example of encrypted tuples we showed in section 3. Finally, SecSpaces [6] extends the operations allowed on Linda spaces to include partitioning the tuple space based on keys (possibly asymmetric) attached to tuples. These keys are treated as with our ∨. After the partitioning, no entry is still encrypted when read, similarly to proposal for distributed selection via secure channels.
Conclusion
In this article we presented tagged sets: a data management approach that relies on tags based on propositional logic to lock and select values. The model is flexible, intuitive, and supports fine-grained access control for individual data, as we have shown with many examples. We believe it is a promising approach to organizing and securing data, and for supporting distributed coordination.
In the future work, we consider both theoretical and implementation enhancements. We intend to flesh out our formalism to model concurrent access with mutation; this would allow us to encode Linda spaces more directly and shed light on synchronization concerns. We are also interested in exploring changes to the specification of tags, e.g., how to add the ¬ operator without compromising confidentiality.
On the implementation side, we are interested in better exploring possibilities for implementing scalable selection. We also would like to investigate further the integration of tagged sets into modern infrastructures like peer-to-peer networks and the handling of cryptography in such distributed networks.
